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COUNTERMAJORITARIAN FEDERALISM
Thomas H. Lee*
An overlooked theme in Justice John Paul Stevens's jurisprudence of
federalism is a respect for the autonomy of state judges as opposed to state
legislators or executives. I shall call this theme "countermajoritarian
federalism." The seeming oxymoron reflects the tension between general
deference to subnational governance ostensibly motivated by a preference
for more popularly responsive rule ("federalism") and specific deference to
judges who-to the extent they are insulated from the political process like
their federal counterparts I-would seem to be the least democratic
subnational governmental unit type ("countermajoritarian").
The ultimate reason for Justice Stevens's countermajoritarian federalism,
in my view, is his strong belief in the crucial role of state judges in
dispensing customized and empathic retail justice to state citizens. State
judges protect people from the excesses and impersonality of distant
majoritarian political processes at both the national and state levels by
supervising the application of laws resulting from those processes to real-
life cases. They also make custom-tailored local law in the many common-
law enclaves that have survived codification trends. Moreover, state judges
are the front-line guardians of people's state and federal constitutional
rights by virtue of the prerogative of judicial review. Finally, citizens'
encounters with the justice system-whether as litigants, jurors, or
witnesses-are most likely to occur in the courtrooms of state judges.
More generally put, federalism for Justice Stevens is not the routine
undifferentiated call for democracy on a smaller scale. Rather, it is centered
upon a respect for state judges as retail-justice providers-a collective
institution delivering empathic justice for the reasons mentioned above.
The performance of this task requires autonomy and respect from the
national government-in particular, the national judiciary-and also from
the democratic influence of the people themselves. In Justice Stevens's
own words,
* Visiting Professor, Columbia Law School; Associate Professor, Fordham University
School of Law.
1. The federal mechanisms of insulation from democratic political forces are
appointment by the President with senatorial advice and consent, U.S. Const. art. 1I, § 2, cl.
2, and lifetime tenure and salary protection, U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 2. Many state judges
are elected or appointed subject to retention reelections. As discussed below, I believe that
Justice Stevens sees a tension between such non-insulating, majoritarian features of state
judicial selection and the essential roles he recognizes for state judiciaries.
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[t]here is a critical difference between the work of the judge and the
work of other public officials. In a democracy, issues of policy are
properly decided by majority vote; it is the business of legislators and
executives to be popular. But in litigation, issues of law or fact should not
be determined by popular vote; it is the business of judges to be
indifferent to unpopularity.2
This Essay has three parts. The first responds to the most common
counter-theory to countermajoritarian federalism: the view that Justice
Stevens does not value federalism at all. The second part identifies the
reasons why state judges warrant autonomy. The final part addresses the
question why relatively autonomous state judges are necessary even with
respect to questions in which federal judges present a functional substitute.
I. INSTRUMENTAL FEDERALISM?
An off-the-cuff assessment of Justice Stevens's statements on federalism
might point out that he generally favors individual rights against the
government, state or federal.3 A possible conclusion from this trend might
be that he promotes state autonomy if and only if state autonomy tangibly
benefits individual rights. Justice Stevens has advocated, for example,
declining U.S. Supreme Court review of state-court decisions upholding
federal individual rights,4 resolving ambiguity in favor of state-law grounds
where it is unclear whether a decision rested on federal or state law (such
cases generally having been decided in favor of individual rights), 5 and,
2. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
3. Notable exceptions to this inclination would appear to be Justice Stevens's attitude
toward flag burning and religious free exercise, where it seems he is more inclined to defer
to governmental regulation of individual rights. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S.
310, 319-321 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Government may-indeed, it should-
protect the symbolic value of the flag without regard to the specific content of the flag
burner's speech."); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 262 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("In my opinion, it is the [religious] objector who must shoulder the burden
of demonstrating that there is a unique reason for allowing him a special exemption from a
valid law of general applicability.").
4. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 695 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to hearing cases that "operaterl to expand this Court's review of state
remedies that overcompensate for violations of federal constitutional rights"); Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I believe that in reviewing the
decisions of state courts, the primary role of this Court is to make sure that persons who seek
to vindicate federal rights have been fairly heard."); cf Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S.
938, 947 (1996) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (objecting to the majority's
characterization of a state-court ruling in favor of a criminal defendant as possibly based on
federal law). This is a position consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's statutory
authorization to review state-court decisions from 1789 until 1914. Compare Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (supplying no provision for Supreme Court review of
state-court decisions in favor of federal rights), and Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat.
385 (same), with Act of December 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790 (authorizing, for the first
time, Supreme Court review of state-court decisions upholding claims of federal right).




overall, shaping these and other doctrines to create incentives for States to
extend protections to individuals under state constitutions and statutes
where relevant federal law is more circumscribed. 6 A theory of federalism
yoked to maximal individual rights would also appear to explain why
Justice Stevens does not favor federal preemption in certain cases;7 perhaps,
the exceptions are instances where state law might be more responsive to
individual rights.8
On this view, Justice Stevens's resort to federalism could be
characterized as instrumental-a charge often leveled against Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr. An instrumental federalist, so it goes, does not
think it very important to privilege the State qua state; rather it is only
important to agitate for state independence of action when the State does
more for the substantive rights of its citizens than the national government
would. Taken to an extreme, if an instrumental federalist were to believe
that a platonic national government did more for individual rights than any
state government did or could ever do, then-if this were Justice Stevens's
true view of federalism-he ought to take no issue with getting rid of the
State and its governance institutions altogether, or, in functional terms,
dismissing entirely the power of any state institution to regulate its citizens
independently. It is not clear to me that Justice Stevens would go that far,
even as a theoretical matter.
But in a larger sense, I have never understood this sort of objection
against seeing federalism as a means to an end. Even the most ardent
states-righter today (in the aftermath of the Civil War and the civil-rights
struggles of the twentieth century) must concede that in essence federalism
is instrumental. 9 The modern theory and doctrines of federalism do not
purport to protect the State qua state, they protect the State as an institution
that is crucial to realizing individual freedoms 0-particularly freedoms
6. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1066; see also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21
(1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
8. In Geier, for instance, the holding of no preemption that Justice Stevens advocated
would have allowed the plaintiff to pursue an action under Washington, D.C., tort law
against the defendant manufacturer for defective design.
9. One could make similar claims about nationalism. That is a question beyond the
scope of this Essay, but, in my view, the two might be distinguished on the grounds that
cultural, historical, and material conditions and-specifically relevant here-definitions of
individual rights, are vastly more divergent as among the nations of the world than among
the States of the United States. Accordingly, it is harder to assert that we should go beyond
the nation-state in our quest for individual rights than it is to make such a claim about
federalism in the American context.
10. Cf Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10
(1982) (noting that characterizations of personal jurisdiction as "reflect[ing] an element of
federalism and the character of state sovereignty vis-A-vis other States" are misleading
because restrictions on state sovereign power "must be seen as ultimately a function of the
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause").
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likely to be perceived as idiosyncratic by the majority of the nation' 1-in
ways that the national government, entrusted with the responsibility of
shaping and enforcing a general, uniform framework of rules for many
millions more souls, could not. 12 Thus, the normative point of federalism is
to preserve a mosaic form of granular governance viewed as superior to
one-size-fits-all national rules in responding to differences in how
individuals define liberty.
Nor could a states-righter credibly say that the State is the perfect
institution for performing this individual-freedom maximizing function.
State borders track individual tastes in liberty only imperfectly, and people
do not have perfect liberty even to choose to live in the State that most
closely suits their tastes in freedom. And not even the most ardent states-
righter would claim that, to address these imperfections of fit and
portability, we must, for federalism's sake, create more new States (like
Utah for the Mormons) or subsidize poor citizens so that they have the
ability to choose their States of preferred residence. 13
Once we expose the analytical poverty of a wholesale charge of
instrumental federalism, it becomes possible to perceive the most fervent
states-righter (short of the extinct secessionist) and the most ardent
nationalist (short of the unconstitutional state-abolitionist' 4) as opposite
points on the same spectrum. That spectrum encompasses a range of beliefs
on how essential one believes a State and its governance institutions are to
the fundamental liberty of its citizens in the present day. It is useful, in
order to see how Justice Stevens stands on this spectrum, to frame the
difference between one end and the other not in the customary fashion of
the substantive content of the basic rights of freedom, but rather as turning
upon the particular state institutions one believes crucial to individual
liberty and thus worthy of deference from the organs of national
governance, regardless of the decisions those state institutions make on
11. The paradigmatic case of such idiosyncratic accommodation in the original
Constitution was slavery. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No Person held to Service
or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence
of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.").
12. The national rules selected might themselves default to state rules. See, e.g., United
States v. Kimbell Foods Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) ("[W]hen there is little need for a
nationally uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of
decision.").
13. Nor are such proposals clearly justifiable as a normative matter, out of concern for
the Balkanization that might ensue. Of course, although in theory, an individual may choose
the state that meets his or her liberty preferences, in reality such preferences are often shaped
by the culture of the state in which he or she is born or raised.
14. The Constitution provides that "no new State shall be formed or erected within the
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more
States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned."
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3.
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substantive questions. 15  Those institutions, of course, are the state
legislature, the state executive, and the state judiciary.
In other words, I believe that framing federalism as a theory of process
independent of substance is the best way to understand Justice Stevens's
position on federalism. This is a frame that is 180 degrees removed from
the first cut at Justice Stevens's theory of federalism as entirely contingent
on substantive outcomes. The question then arises as to why he believes it
so important that the judiciary, among state governance institutions, should
be accorded autonomy.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF AUTONOMOUS STATE JUDGES
Under the Supremacy Clause, state judges, unlike state legislators and
governors, are expressly "bound" by federal law, "any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."' 16 The
Federal Constitution thus appears to contemplate that state judges-just like
federal judges--decide questions of federal law. These decisions are
subject to appellate review by the U.S. Supreme Court by statute, 17 but the
chances of actual review are very small given current certiorari practices. 18
State judges are thus an integral part of the national court system, subject to
light-touch supervision in this capacity by the U.S. Supreme Court. From
this perspective, if state judges give more protection to a federal right than
federal judges would, it does not seem as important to correct them as when
they rule against the federal right and thereby implicate the Supremacy
Clause. Moreover, frequent corrections might encourage state judges to
engage in reactionary contractions of federal rights as self-overcorrection.
15. The ardent states-righter would presumably believe that the state executive,
legislature, and judiciary are jointly worthy of autonomy: Individual freedom would be best
served if the State makes, enforces, and reviews as much law as possible. Of course, most
important is the power to make the laws, which is why states' rights advocates especially
object to extensions of federal legislative power over the States and their citizens. To be
sure, Congress itself consists of politically elected representatives of the States, but the
states' rights objection to the adequacy of the "political safeguards of federalism," Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954), is
that the accommodations necessary and natural in a national legislative body will frequently
result in outcomes affecting a State's citizens that a State on its own might not have reached.
The Rehnquist Court sought to roll back national legislative power by, among other things,
restricting the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power, see United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000), United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), but see Gonzales v.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005), by expanding state sovereign immunity doctrine to blunt the
force of federal law on the State's own governance institutions, see Fed. Mar. Comm'n v.
S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002), Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and by limiting the scope of federal statutory
claims against state officials actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), see Gonzaga Univ.
v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
16. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000).
18. See Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-
First Century, 35 Ind. L. Rev. 335 (2002) (detailing the decline of state cases in the Court's
docket).
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Consider, also, the importance of the federal-question function of the
state courts in light of Congress's power to restrict and perhaps to eliminate
the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. From time to time, congressional bills
have called for stripping the federal courts' jurisdiction over controversial
subject matter such as abortion, the pledge of allegiance, and school
prayer. 19 It is not inconceivable that such an initiative might one day get
enacted and be upheld by the Court, in which case the pertinent federal
right-even if constitutional-might be left solely to the state courts for
enforcement. Thus, state judges, in a very real sense, are the last refuge of
those individual rights most vulnerable to majoritarian condemnation at the
national level.
Additionally, unlike federal judges cabined by the constitutional
separation-of-powers principle, a large part of a state judge's job is to
"make" law by deciding common-law suits.20  This has endured
notwithstanding the tendency toward greater codification in the states.
These common-law cases concern subject matter such as contracts,
property, torts, family law, and probate, of great importance to the everyday
lives and activities of ordinary people. Wise decisions here require not just
legal knowledge but accumulated local knowledge of customs and
expectations, and insight into the human actors embroiled in controversy.
If one believes, as I think Justice Stevens does, that regulation of these
sorts of life activities are best governed by rules applied in a customized
way by state judges (and not top-down by legislators whether state or
national), then this area of jurisprudence is the very heartland of
countermajoritarian federalism. A resistance to federal preemption in
common-law enclaves is accordingly more a matter of letting on-the-ground
judges as opposed to high-altitude legislators decide the issue than a
pragmatic preference for state substantive law because it better advances
individual rights. As Justice Stevens put it,
Because of the role of States as separate sovereigns in our federal system,
we have long presumed that state laws-particularly those, such as the
provision of tort remedies to compensate for personal injuries, that are
within the scope of the States' historic police powers-are not to be pre-
19. E.g., S. 1297, 108th Cong. (2003) (amending the jurisdiction of both the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts over cases involving the pledge of allegiance); H.R. 1624,
104th Cong. (1995) (modifying the jurisdiction of the federal courts with respect to
abortion); S. 74, 101st Cong. § 1260(a) (1989) (exempting from Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction "any case arising out of any State statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, practice, or
any part thereof, or arising out of any act interpreting, applying, enforcing, or effecting any
State statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, or practice, which relates to voluntary prayer, Bible
reading, or religious meetings in public schools or public buildings").
20. Federal judges do make federal common law, but the guiding principle is that such
lawmaking should be interstitial and limited, even as the scope of national governmental
legislation and regulation has expanded. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Daniel J.
Meltzer, & David L. Shapiro, Hart and Weschler's the Federal Courts and the Federal
System 685-730 (5th ed. 2003).
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empted by a federal statute unless it is the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress to do so. 2 1
If liability standards, as a general matter, are more likely to be set top-down
by state legislators and remedies bottom-up by state judges, one might be
ambivalent about federal preemption of liability standards but strongly
oppose such preemption of remedies. Additionally, raising the bar insofar
as preemption of state common law is concerned creates an incentive for
state legislatures to restrain codification impulses as a defense against
preemption, deferring more lawmaking to bottom-up formulation through
state judiciaries.
Although the theme of countermajoritarian federalism may be most
clearly evident in Justice Stevens's opinions advocating deference to state-
court decisions upholding federal rights and opposing federal preemption of
state common law made by judges, it is also manifest in other less obvious
ways. For instance, his commitment to countermajoritarian federalism
helps to explain Justice Stevens's refusal to strike down state restrictions on
campaign statements by state judicial candidates on federal constitutional
grounds, notwithstanding his strong commitment to First Amendment
protection of political speech.22 This is because the capacity to dole out
justice fairly requires insulation from political pressure-it is, after all,
countermajoritarian federalism. Justice Stevens's special solicitude for the
state (and federal) judges in the trenches is also evident in his oft-professed
enthusiasm for percolation of federal issues among state supreme courts and
federal circuit courts before the Supreme Court grants certiorari:
[T]he existence of differing rules of law in different sections of our great
country is not always an intolerable evil . . . . [E]xperience with
conflicting interpretations of federal rules [of law] may help to illuminate
an issue before it is finally resolved and thus may play a constructive role
in the lawmaking process.2 3
Countermajoritarian federalism even illuminates a noteworthy aspect of
Justice Stevens's jurisprudence viewed as hostile to federalism, namely, his
groundbreaking opinion for the Court in BMW of North America v. Gore,
applying the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to punitive
damages awarded by state-court juries. 24  From the perspective of
countermajoritarian federalism, the decision makes sense because it gives
state judges a powerful tool to discipline and curtail runaway juries, whose
excesses might shake the public's confidence in the state and national
judicial systems.
21. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 894 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 797 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
23. John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 Judicature 177, 183
(1982); see, e.g., McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (Stevens, J.) (advising the
denial of certiorari when a question would benefit from "further study" in lower courts).
24. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 602 (1996).
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It bears noting, however, that the theme of countermajoritarian
federalism does not mean the Supreme Court should not exercise any
discretion over the decisions reached by state courts on traditional common-
law subjects. For instance, if a state judge rules that a child should be taken
from a white mother who has married a black man, then the Court ought to
step in to correct the equal-protection violation, as it did in Palmore v.
Sidoti,25 a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger. Nor does
it mean that the Court ought to look the other way when state criminal
proceedings prosecuted by the state executive and umpired by the state
judge, particularly those involving punishment by death, are tainted by
federal constitutional violations.26  The constant theme here is that
respecting state judicial autonomy does not mean abdication of
responsibility to supervise state judges when federal constitutional issues
are at stake.
III. THE STATE JUDGE AND JUSTICE AS SOCIAL FACT
The last point above raises an interesting question from an opposite
direction. To the extent that state judges are important for the enforcement
of federal rights, why should they have any autonomy in their exercise of
this function given the parallel and overlapping option of original or
removal jurisdiction in the lower federal courts?
One obvious response is a red herring. Unlike federal judges, many state
judges are elected for finite terms or initially appointed and then subject to
election for follow-on terms. The fact of election appears to render moot
the principal criticism of federal judges appointed for life subject to good
behavior by the President with the Senate's advice and consent-their lack
of democratic pedigree, the so-called "countermajoritarian difficulty. '27
But, as I have said, Justice Stevens values state judicial autonomy precisely
for this countermajoritarian feature.28
The real answer to the question lies in the radically different scales of the
federal and the various state judicial operations. There are less than nine
hundred active Article III judges;29 there are tens of thousands of state
25. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
26. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 179 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(urging the setting aside of a conviction on federal collateral review in a capital case where
the judge appointed a murder victim's lawyer as the defendant's counsel).
27. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 16-23 (1962); John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 4-9 (1980).
28. The test to see if I am correct on this would be to see whether his doctrinal position
on, for instance, preemption of state common law, would change in a counterfactual world
where every state judge was elected in a politicized partisan election.
29. There are 879 authorized Article III judges: nine Supreme Court Justices, 179
Circuit Court judges, 679 District Court judges, and twelve Court of International Trade
judges. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business 2004, at 33
tbl. 12, http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/front/JudicialBusiness.pdf (numbers of
authorized circuit and district judges as of September 30, 2004); Judges of the United States
Court of International Trade, http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/Judges/udges.htm (last visited
Feb. 15, 2006) (listing twelve active judges of the court). The active judges are
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judges. An oft talked-about feature associated with this numerical
imbalance is the perceived lack of parity in the quality of state as compared
to federal judges. 30
But one can as easily see the benefits that greater numbers confer in
terms of the delivery of retail justice. More judges means more cases
decided and more custom-tailoring in the dispensation of justice. And more
citizens will be called to serve as state jurors and interact with state judges,
who will instruct them in the performance of their civic duty. From a
potential litigant's perspective-particularly litigants of limited means-the
greater scale of the state judicial system means that it may be cheaper and
more convenient for her to litigate in a state forum, which is likely to be
closer to home.
State judges come not only in greater numbers, they also have a greater
scope of power to protect the individual from majoritarian excess at the
state as well as the federal level. A state judge can decide most federal-law
questions as well as any state-law question, but the compact federal judicial
corps has only limited power to decide state-law questions. 31 Thus, federal
judges generally cannot protect state citizens from questionable state laws
that do not rise to the level of federal violations, even though state
majorities will surely find ways to oppress "discrete and insular
minorities" 32 by federally permissible means. In other words, although
state and federal judges overlap in function, the limited subject-matter
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary necessarily makes it an inferior
institution for the countermajoritarian protection of state citizens in a
federal system. And so if the question boils down to which we would keep
supplemented by about 400 senior judges with reduced workloads. Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, supra, at 33 tbl. 12.
30. Empirical studies have largely failed to confirm the perception; some argue that it is
illusory. Compare Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in
Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 213 (1983), with Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977).
31. Federal courts, whether lower courts through their original jurisdiction or the
Supreme Court through its appellate jurisdiction, do have some power to decide state-law
questions notwithstanding that state courts formally have the last word. For instance, district
courts may decide state-law questions in diversity cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000), or when
they are part of the same case or controversy in a federal-question suit, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
(2000), and all federal courts may reexamine state-law questions decided by the state courts
that are antecedent to deciding the validity of a federal claim. See, e.g., Indiana ex rel.
Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) ("On such a question, one primarily of state
law, we accord respectful consideration and great weight to the views of the State's highest
court but, in order that the constitutional mandate may not become a dead letter, we are
bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made, what are its terms and
conditions, and whether the State has, by later legislation, impaired its obligation."); Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). A good recent example of federal courts
deciding state-law questions is Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 126
S. Ct. 961 (2006), where the Court unanimously vacated a U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit decision striking down a New Hampshire statute with instructions to the federal
appellate court to sever the parts of it found to be unconstitutional-a state-law issue.
32. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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if forced to keep just one, it is the state judiciary-not the federal-which
seems the essential justice-serving institution.
After all, justice, as a social fact, is what judges do. And most citizens'
experience of judges is at the state level. State judges are the infantry of a
governance institution that is the backbone of a nation initiated and
dedicated to the rule of law. They should be encouraged and given
responsibility, with light supervision the general rule, subject to more active
oversight by the Court only when they have abdicated or flouted their
federal constitutional duties. Justice Stevens wrote some words much to
this effect in a case a few years ago:
What must underlie petitioners' entire federal assault on the Florida
election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality
and capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if
the vote count were to proceed. Otherwise, their position is wholly
without merit. The endorsement of that position by the majority of this
Court can only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of
judges throughout the land. It is confidence in the men and women who
administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of
law. 33
At bottom, then, the reason to encourage and respect state judges is not
an Olympian ideal of a judicial elite with superhuman ability to reason who
reject politics as a vulgar activity beneath their station. Rather, it is an
image of tens of thousands of publicly minded men and women, with
wisdom born more of empathy, familiarity with local circumstances,
dedication to the judicial task, and common sense, who are wary of politics
because it is too often motivated by self-interest. In short, men and women
of Midwestern sensibility and impeccable integrity cut in the bow-tied mold
of the longest-serving member of the highest court in the land.
33. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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